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Abstract
We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a
discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated
by a (non-linear) g-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum game on discrete
stopping times with two agents who aim at minimizing their respective risks. The
payoffs of the agents are assessed by g-expectations (with possibly different drivers for
the different players). By using the results of the first part, combined with some ideas
of S. Hamadène and J. Zhang, we construct a Nash equilibrium point of this game by
a recursive procedure. Our results are obtained in the case of a standard Lipschitz
driver g without any additional assumption on the driver besides that ensuring the
monotonicity of the corresponding g-expectation.
Keywords: optimal stopping, non-zero-sum Dynkin game, g-expectation, dynamic
risk measure, game option, Nash equilibrium
1 Introduction
Initiated by Bismut Bismut (1976), Bismut (1973) (in the linear case), the theory of back-
ward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs for short) has been further developed by
Pardoux and Peng Pardoux and Peng (1990) in their seminal paper. The theory of BSDEs
∗(Corresponding Author) Institute for Mathematics, Humboldt University-Berlin
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has found a number of applications in finance, among which pricing and hedging of Euro-
pean options, recursive utilities, risk measurement. BSDEs induce a family of operators,
the so-called g-conditional expectations, which have proved useful in the literature on (non-
linear) dynamic risk measures (cf., e.g., Peng (2004), Rosazza-Gianin (2006)). We recall
that the g-conditional expectation at time t ∈ [0, T ] (where T > 0 is a fixed time horizon,
and g is a Lipschitz driver) is the operator which maps a given terminal condition ξ (where
ξ is a square-integrable random variable, measurable with respect to the information at
time T ) to the position at time t of (the first component of) the solution of the BSDE
with parameters (g, ξ). This operator is denoted by Egt,T (·). The operator E
g
0,T (·) is called
g-expectation.
On the other hand, zero-sum Dynkin games have been introduced by Dynkin in Dynkin
(1969) in the discrete-time framework. Since then, there have been lots of contributions
to zero-sum Dynkin games both in discrete time and in continuous time (cf., e.g., Bismut
(1977), Neveu (1972), Alario-Nazaret et al. (1982), Lepeltier and Maingueneau (1984)). A
prominent financial example is given by the pricing problem of game options (also known as
Israeli options), introduced by Kifer in Kifer (2000). Compared to the zero-sum case, there
have been fewer works on the non-zero-sum case. We can quote Hamadène and Zhang
(2010), Laraki and Solan (2013), Hamadène and Hassani (2014) in the continuous-time
setting, and Morimoto (1986), Ohtsubo (1987), Shmaya and Solan (2004), Hamadène and Hassani
(2014) in the discrete-time setting. For a recent survey on zero-sum and non-zero-sum
Dynkin games the reader is referred to Kifer (2013).
In all the above references the players’ payoffs are assessed by "classical" mathemati-
cal expectations. In the recent years, some authors (cf. Dumitrescu et al. (2013), and
Bayraktar and Yao (2015)) have considered "generalized" Dynkin games in continuous time
where the "classical" expectations are replaced by more general (non-linear) functionals.
All these extensions are limited to the zero-sum case.
In the present paper, we address a game problem with two "stoppers" whose profits (or
payoffs) are assessed by non-linear dynamic risk measures and who aim at minimizing their
risk. More concretely, the following situation is of interest to us: we are given two adapted
processes X and Y with X ≤ Y and XT = YT a.s. We consider a game option in discrete
time, that is, a contract between two "stoppers" (a seller and a buyer) who can act only at
given times 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tn = T , where n ∈ N. The two agents can thus choose their
strategies only among the discrete stopping times with values in the grid {t0, t1, . . . , tn}.
We denote by T d0,T this set of stopping times. Recall that the game option gives the buyer
the right to exercise at any (discrete) stopping time τ1 ∈ T
d
0,T and the seller the right to
cancel at any (discrete) stopping time τ2 ∈ T
d
0,T . In financial terms, we could say that
both the seller’s cancellation strategy and the buyer’s exercise strategy are of Bermudan
type. If the buyer exercises at time τ1 before the seller cancels, then the seller pays to the
buyer the amount Xτ1 ; otherwise, the buyer receives from the seller the amount Yτ2 at the
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cancellation time τ2. The difference Yτ2 − Xτ2 ≥ 0 is interpreted as a penalty which the
seller pays to the buyer in the case of an early cancellation of the contract. To summarize,
if the seller chooses a cancellation time τ2 and the buyer chooses an exercise time τ1, the
former pays to the latter the payoff
I(τ1, τ2) := Xτ1I{τ1≤τ2} + Yτ2I{τ2<τ1}
at time τ1 ∧ τ2. The seller’s payoff at time τ1 ∧ τ2 is equal to −I(τ1, τ2).
We emphasize that our aim here is not to determine a "fair price" (or a "fair premium")
for the game option, but rather to determine an "equilibrium" for the game problem related
to the risk minimization of both the seller and the buyer.
The seller and the buyer are assumed to evaluate the risk of their payoffs in a (possibly)
different manner.
The dynamic risk measure ρf1 (resp. ρf2) of the buyer (resp. the seller) is induced by
a BSDE with driver f1 (resp. f2). Up to a minus sign, ρ
f1 (resp. ρf2) corresponds to the
family of f1-conditional expectations (resp. f2-conditional expectations).
If, at time 0, the buyer chooses τ1 as exercise time and the seller chooses τ2 as cancel-
lation time, the buyer’s (resp. seller’s) risk at time 0 is thus given by
ρ
f1
0,τ1∧τ2
(I(τ1, τ2)) = −E
f1
0,τ1∧τ2
(I(τ1, τ2))
resp. ρf20,τ1∧τ2(−I(τ1, τ2)) = −E
f2
0,τ1∧τ2
(−I(τ1, τ2)).
The goal of each of the agents is to minimize his/her risk. We are interested in finding
an "equilibrium" pair of discrete stopping times (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) for this problem, that is, a pair
(τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) ∈ T
d
0,T × T
d
0,T such that the first agent’s risk attains its minimum at τ
∗
1 when the
strategy of the second one is fixed at τ∗2 , and the second agent’s risk attains its minimum
at τ∗2 when the strategy of the first one is fixed at τ
∗
1 . In other words, we are looking for a
pair (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) ∈ T
d
0,T × T
d
0,T satisfying
max
τ1∈T d0,T
Ef10,τ1∧τ∗2
(I(τ1, τ
∗
2 )) = E
f1
0,τ∗1∧τ
∗
2
(I(τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ))
max
τ2∈T d0,T
Ef20,τ∗1∧τ2
(−I(τ∗1 , τ2)) = E
f2
0,τ∗1∧τ
∗
2
(−I(τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 )).
In the terminology of game theory, the above game problem is of a non-zero-sum type, and
a pair (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) satisfying the above properties corresponds to a Nash equilibrium point of
this non-zero-sum game. This game problem can be seen as a "generalized" non-zero-sum
Dynkin game problem (the term "generalized" refers to the fact that our problem involves
non-linear expectations instead of classical expectations). Note that in the trivial case
where f1 = f2 = 0, our game reduces to a classical zero-sum Dynkin game (with classical
expectations). Let us also mention that we can easily incorporate in our framework the
situation where the seller and/or the buyer apply their respective risk measures to their
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net gains (that is the payoff minus the initial price of the game option) instead of to their
payoffs. If the initial price of the option is given by x (where x > 0), the buyer’s (resp.
seller’s) net gain at time τ1 ∧ τ2 is given by I(τ1, τ2)− x (resp. x− I(τ1, τ2)).
We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium point for the non-zero-sum Dynkin game
problem described above by using a constructive approach similar to that of Hamadène and Zhang
(2010), Hamadène and Hassani (2014), and Hamadène and Hassani (2014).
This approach requires some results on optimal stopping with one agent. We are thus
led to considering first the following family of problems:
V (tk) := ess inf
τ∈T dtk,T
ρ
g
tk ,τ
(ξτ ) = −ess sup
τ∈T dtk,T
Egtk ,τ (ξτ ), for all k ∈ 0, 1, . . . , n, (1)
where T dtk ,T denotes the set of discrete stopping times valued in {tk, . . . , tn} and where ξ is a
given square-integrable adapted process. We characterize the sequence of random variables
(V (tk))k∈N via a backward recursive construction. We also show that the stopping time
τ∗ := τ∗(tk) := inf{t ∈ {tk, . . . , tn}, V (t) = ξt}, which belongs to T
d
tk,T
, is optimal for (1)
at time tk. To prove our results, we use a generalization of the martingale approach to
the case of g-conditional expectations in discrete time. Our results are established without
any additional assumption on the driver g besides that ensuring the monotonicity of the
corresponding g-conditional expectations. In particular, we do not make an assumption of
"groundedness" on g (that is, the assumption g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0), nor do we make an assump-
tion of concavity/convexity on g, nor an assumption of "independence from y" (that is,
g(t, y, z, k) = g(t, y′, z, k), for all y, y′ ∈ R), which are sometimes made in the literature.
Optimal stopping problems with one agent whose payoff is assessed by a non-linear expec-
tation have been largely studied. A continuous-time version of Problem (1) has been con-
sidered in El Karoui and Quenez (1997), Quenez and Sulem (2014) and Grigorova et al.
(2015). Related works include, but are not limited to, Bayraktar et al. (2010), Bayraktar and Yao
(2011). The discrete-time version of Problem (1) has been introduced by Krätschmer
and Schoenmakers in Krätschmer and Schoenmakers (2010), Example 2.7, who address
the problem under stronger assumptions on the driver g than those made in the present
paper. In particular, the authors of Krätschmer and Schoenmakers (2010) need the zero-
one law for g-expectation, and the property Egt,T (ξ) = ξ, for all t, for all ξ square-integrable
Ft-measurable. These two properties do not hold for a general Lipschitz driver g. For this
reason, the results from Krätschmer and Schoenmakers (2010) are not applicable in our
framework; thus, we have been led to studying Problem (1) by using different techniques.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we set the framework
and the notation. Section 3 is dedicated to the optimal stopping problem with one player.
In Subsection 3.1, we define the notion of g-(super)martingales in discrete time and we
give some of their properties; in Subsection 3.2, we characterize the value function of our
optimal stopping problem and we show the existence of optimal stopping times. In Section
4, we formulate our non-zero-sum Dynkin game with two players and we show the existence
of a Nash equilibrium. In Section 5, we briefly comment upon possible extensions of our
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results. The Appendix contains a useful property of g-expectations (Prop. A.1), along with
some related remarks, as well as the proof of an easy result from Section 3.
2 The framework
Let T be a fixed positive real number. Let (E,K) be a measurable space equipped with a
σ-finite positive measure ν. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a (complete) probability space equipped with
a one-dimensional Brownian motion W and with an independent Poisson random measure
N(dt, de) with compensator dt⊗ ν(de). We denote by N˜(dt, de) the compensated process,
i.e. N˜(dt, de) := N˜(dt, de)− dt⊗ ν(de). Let F = {Ft : t ∈ [0, T ]} be the (complete) natural
filtration associated with W and N .
We use the following notation:
• L2(FT ) is the set of random variables which are FT -measurable and square-integrable.
• L2ν is the set of K-measurable functions ℓ : E → R such that ‖ℓ‖
2
ν :=
∫
E
|ℓ(e)|2ν(de) <
∞. For ℓ ∈ L2ν , k ∈ L
2
ν , we define 〈ℓ, k〉ν :=
∫
E
ℓ(e)k(e)ν(de).
• H2,T is the set of real-valued predictable processes φ such that
‖φ‖2
H2,T
:= E
[
(
∫ T
0 |φt|
2dt)
]
<∞.
• H2,Tν is the set of real-valued processes l : (ω, t, e) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] × E 7→ lt(ω, e) ∈ R
which are predictable, that is (P ⊗K)-measurable, and such that
‖l‖2
H
2,T
ν
:= E
[∫ T
0
‖lt‖
2
ν dt
]
<∞.
• S2,T is the set of real-valued RCLL adapted processes ϕ such that
ϕ2
S2,T
:= E(supt∈[0,T ] |ϕt|
2) <∞.
We recall the following terminology from BSDE theory.
Definition 2.1 (Lipschitz driver, standard data) A function g is said to be a driver if the
following two conditions hold:
• (measurability) g : Ω× [0, T ]× R2 × L2ν → R
(ω, t, y, z; ℓ) 7→ g(ω, t, y, z, ℓ) is P ⊗ B(R2) ⊗ B(L2ν)− measurable, where P is the
predictable σ-algebra on Ω× [0, T ], B(R2) is the Borel σ-algebra on R2, and B(L2ν) is
the Borel σ-algebra on L2ν .
• (integrability) E
[
(
∫ T
0 |g(t, 0, 0, 0)|
2dt)
]
<∞.
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A driver g is called a Lipschitz driver (or a standard Lipschitz driver) if moreover there
exists a constant K ≥ 0 such that dP ⊗dt-a.e. , for each (y1, z1, ℓ1) ∈ R
2×L2ν, (y2, z2, ℓ2) ∈
R
2 × L2ν ,
|g(ω, t, y1, z1, ℓ1)− g(ω, t, y2, z2, ℓ2)| ≤ K(|y1 − y2|+ |z1 − z2|+ ‖ℓ1 − ℓ2‖ν).
A pair (g, ξ) such that g is a Lipschitz driver and ξ ∈ L2(Ω,FT , P ) is called a pair of
standard data, or a pair of standard parameters.
Let (ξ, g) be a pair of standard data. The BSDE associated with Lipschitz driver g, terminal
time T , and terminal condition ξ, is formulated as follows:
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
g(s, Ys, Zs, ks)ds −
∫ T
t
ZsdWs −
∫ T
t
∫
E
ks(e)N˜ (ds, de), for t ∈ [0, T ]. (2)
We recall that the above BSDE admits a unique solution triplet (Y,Z, k) in the space
S2,T ×H2,T ×H2,Tν . We denote by E
g
·,T (ξ) the first component of the solution of that BSDE
(i.e. (Egt,T (ξ))t∈[0,T ] is the family of g-conditional evaluations of ξ in the vocabulary of S.
Peng).
Recall also (cf., e.g., El Karoui et al. El Karoui et al. (1997)) that if the terminal time is
given by a stopping time τ ∈ T0,T and if ξ is Fτ -measurable, the solution of the BSDE
associated with terminal time τ , terminal condition ξ and Lipschitz driver g is defined as
the solution of the BSDE with (fixed) terminal time T , terminal condition ξ and Lipschitz
driver gτ given by
gτ (t, y, z, ℓ) := g(t, y, z, ℓ)I{t≤τ} .
The first component of this solution is thus equal to (Eg
τ
t,T (ξ))t∈[0,T ]. In the sequel it is also
denoted by (Egt,τ (ξ))t∈[0,T ]. We have E
g
t,τ (ξ) = ξ a.s. on the set {t ≥ τ}.
Recall that T is interpreted as the final time horizon. For each T ′ ∈ [0, T ] and η ∈
L2(FT ′), we set
ρ
g
t,T ′(η) := −E
g
t,T ′(η), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
′, (3)
If T ′ represents a given maturity and η a financial position at time T ′, then ρgt,T ′(η) is
interpreted as the risk of η at time t. The functional ρg : (η, T ′) 7→ ρg·,T ′(η) thus repre-
sents a dynamic risk measure induced by the BSDE with driver g. In order to ensure the
monotonicity property of ρg, that is, the monotonicity property with respect to the finan-
cial position, which is naturally required for risk measures, we assume from now on that
the driver g satisfies the following assumption (cf. (Quenez and Sulem, 2013, Thm. 4.2,
combined with Prop. 3.2) and the references therein).
Assumption 2.1 Assume that dP ⊗ dt-a.e. for each (y, z, ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ R
2 × (L2ν)
2,
g(t, y, z, ℓ1)− g(t, y, z, ℓ2) ≥ 〈θ
y,z,ℓ1,ℓ2
t , ℓ1 − ℓ2〉ν ,
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where the mapping
θ : [0, T ] × Ω× R2 × (L2ν)
2 → L2ν ; (ω, t, y, z, ℓ1, ℓ2) 7→ θ
y,z,ℓ1,ℓ2
t (ω, ·)
is P⊗B(R2)⊗B((L2ν)
2)-measurable, and satisfies dP ⊗dt⊗dν(e)-a.e. , for each (y, z, ℓ1, ℓ2)
∈ R2 × (L2ν)
2,
θ
y,z,ℓ1,ℓ2
t (e) ≥ −1. (4)
Assume, moreover, that θ is uniformly bounded, in the sense that, dP ⊗ dt-a.e. , for each
(y, z, ℓ1, ℓ2), ‖θ
y,z,ℓ1,ℓ2
t ‖ν ≤ K, where K is a positive constant.
3 Optimal stopping with g-expectations in discrete time
Let (ξt)t∈[0,T ] be a given F-adapted square-integrable process modelling an agent’s dynamic
financial position. The agent is allowed to "stop" only at given times 0 = t0 < t1 <
. . . < tn = T , where n ∈ N. The agent’s risk is assessed through a dynamic risk measure ρ
g
induced by a BSDE with a given Lipschitz driver g; the dynamic risk measure ρg corresponds
(up to a minus sign) to the family of g-conditional expectations . The agent’s aim at time
0 is to choose his/her strategy in such a way that the risk of his/her position from "time
0-perspective" be minimal. The minimal risk at time 0 is defined by
V (0) := inf
τ∈T d0,T
ρ
g
0,τ (ξτ ) = − sup
τ∈T d0,T
Eg0,τ (ξτ ). (5)
We have V (0) = −V0, where
V0 := sup
τ∈T d0,T
Eg0,τ (ξτ ). (6)
We are thus facing an optimal stopping problem in discrete time with g-expectation. Our
purpose in this section is to compute or characterize the minimal risk measure V (0) (or
equivalently, V0) and to study the question of the existence of an optimal stopping time.
In order to simplify the notation, we suppose from now on that the terminal time T is in N
and that tk = k, for all k = 1, . . . , n. In this case, the set T
d
tk,T
corresponds to the set T dk,T
of stopping times whose values are almost surely in the set {k, k + 1, . . . , T}. We will use
the notation Fd for the filtration (Fk)k∈{0,1,...,T}.
3.1 Discrete-time g-(super)martingales
We introduce the notion of discrete-time g-(super)martingales, which is to be compared with
the definition of a Eg-supermartingale (in continuous time), respectively Eg-martingale (in
continuous time).
Definition 3.1 Let (φk)k∈{0,1,...,T} be a sequence of square-integrable random variables,
adapted to (Fk)k∈{0,1,...,T}. We say that the sequence (φk) is a g-supermartingale (resp.
g-martingale) in discrete time if φk ≥ E
g
k,k+1(φk+1), for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}.
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Remark 3.1 We note that if (φt)t∈[0,T ] is a E
g-martingale (in continuous time) with respect
to the filtration F, then (φk)k∈{0,1,...,T} is a g-martingale in discrete time in the sense of
Definition 3.1.
Remark 3.2 In the case where g ≡ 0 (corresponding to the classical expectation), if
(φk)k∈{0,1,...,T} is a discrete-time martingale with respect to (Fk)k∈{0,1,...,T}, then (φk)k∈{0,1,...,T}
can be extended into a continuous-time martingale with respect to F (with time parameter t
in [0, T ]) by setting φt := φk, for all t ∈ (k, k+1), for all k ∈ {0, . . . , T −1}. This statement
does not necessarily hold true in the case of a general driver g.
Remark 3.3 Let (φt) be a square-integrable adapted process. We recall that by definition
Egt,s(φs) = φs, for all T ≥ t ≥ s ≥ 0.
If φt is Ft-measurable, then E
gt
t,T (φt) = E
g
t,t(φt) = φt.
Theorem 3.1 Let (φk)k∈{0,1,...,T} be a g-supermartingale (resp. a g-martingale) in discrete
time. Let τ ∈ T d0,T . Then, the stopped process (φk∧τ )k∈{0,1,...,T} is a g
τ -supermartingale
(resp. a gτ -martingale) in discrete time.
Proof : Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. Since Eg
τ
k,k+1(φ(k+1)∧τ ) = E
g
k,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ), it is
sufficient to prove the following:
Eg
k,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) ≤ φk∧τ . (7)
We write
Eg
k,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) = I{τ≤k}E
g
k,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) + I{τ≥k+1}E
g
k,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ). (8)
Due to the definition of the solution of a standard BSDE with a stopping time as a terminal
time, we have
I{τ≤k}E
g
k,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) = I{τ≤k}φ(k+1)∧τ = I{τ≤k}φτ . (9)
For the second term on the right-hand side of equation (8) we have
I{τ≥k+1}E
g
k,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) ≤ I{τ≥k+1}φk∧τ . (10)
Indeed, after noticing that I{τ≥k+1} is Fk-measurable, we apply Proposition A.1 to obtain
I{τ≥k+1}E
g
k,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) = I{τ≥k+1}E
g(k+1)∧τ
k,T (φ(k+1)∧τ )
= E
g(k+1)∧τ I{τ≥k+1}
k,T (I{τ≥k+1}φk+1).
(11)
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By using the fact that g(k+1)∧τ I{τ≥k+1} = g
k+1
I{τ≥k+1} and by applying Proposition A.1
again, we get
E
g(k+1)∧τ I{τ≥k+1}
k,T (I{τ≥k+1}φk+1) = E
gk+1I{τ≥k+1}
k,T (I{τ≥k+1}φk+1)
= I{τ≥k+1}E
gk+1
k,T (φk+1) = I{τ≥k+1}E
g
k,k+1(φk+1).
(12)
As φ is a g-supermartingale in discrete time, we have I{τ≥k+1}E
g
k,k+1(φk+1) ≤ I{τ≥k+1}φk =
I{τ≥k+1}φk∧τ , which proves the inequality (10). From (9) and (10) we get the desired in-
equality (7). The theorem is thus proved. 
Remark 3.4 We know that a "classical" (super)martingale in discrete time, stopped at
a stopping time τ , is again a (super)martingale. A g-(super)martingale in discrete time,
stopped at a stopping time τ ∈ T d0,T , is generally not a g-(super)martingale, but a g
τ -
(super)martingale (in virtue of the previous Theorem 3.1). This is illustrated by the follow-
ing example. Let g be a driver which does not depend on y, z, and ℓ (i.e. g(ω, t, y, ℓ) ≡
g(ω, t)). Recall that in this case the solution Y of the BSDE with driver g and terminal
condition ξ is given explicitly by
Yt = E(
∫ T
t
g(s)ds + ξ|Ft), for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (13)
Assume that g is positive. Let φ be a g-martingale in discrete time and take τ ≡ k, where
k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. By applying (13) with ξ := φk, we obtain
Egk,T (φ(k+1)∧k) = E
g
k,T (φk) = E(
∫ T
k
g(s)ds + φk|Fk) = E(
∫ T
k
g(s)ds|Fk) + φk > φk,
the inequality being due to the positivity of g. Hence, φ stopped at k is not a g-martingale
in discrete time.
We now establish an "optional sampling" result for g-supermartingales (resp. for g-
martingales). The result can be obtained as a corollary of the previous theorem.
Corollary 3.1 Let (φk)k∈{0,1,...,T} be a g-supermartingale (resp. a g-martingale) in discrete
time. Then, for σ, τ in T d0,T such that σ ≤ τ a.s., we have
Egσ,τ (φτ ) ≤ φσ (resp. = φσ) a.s.
Proof : We prove the result for the case of a g-supermartingale; the case of a g-martingale
can be treated similarly. Let σ, τ in T d0,T be such that σ ≤ τ a.s. We notice that it suffices
to prove the following property:
Egk∧τ,τ (φτ ) ≤ φk∧τ , for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}. (14)
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Indeed, this property proven, we will have
Egσ,τ (φτ ) = E
g
σ∧τ,τ (φτ ) =
T∑
k=0
I{σ=k}E
g
k∧τ,τ (φτ ) ≤
T∑
k=0
I{σ=k}φk∧τ = φσ∧τ = φσ,
which will conclude the proof. Let us now prove property (14). We proceed by backward
induction. At the final time T we have
EgT∧τ,τ (φτ ) = E
g
τ,τ (φτ ) = φτ = φT∧τ .
We suppose that the property (14) holds true for k + 1. Then, by using this induction
hypothesis, the time-consistency and the monotonicity of the g-conditional expectation
(the latter property holds under Assumption 2.1), we get
Egk∧τ,τ (φτ ) = E
g
k∧τ,(k+1)∧τ (E
g
(k+1)∧τ,τ (φτ )) ≤ E
g
k∧τ,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ).
In order to conclude, it remains to prove
Eg
k∧τ,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) ≤ φk∧τ . (15)
We have
I{τ≥k}E
g
k∧τ,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) = I{τ≥k}E
g
k,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) ≤ I{τ≥k}φk∧τ , (16)
where we have used Theorem 3.1 to obtain the inequality.
By Proposition A.1, we have
I{τ<k}E
g
k∧τ,(k+1)∧τ (φ(k+1)∧τ ) = E
g(k+1)∧τ I{τ<k}
τ,T (φτ I{τ<k}). (17)
According to the convention given in Remark A.2, the "driver" g(k+1)∧τ (s, y, z, ℓ)I{τ<k} is
here equal to g(k+1)∧τ (s, y, z, ℓ)I{τ<k}I]τ,T ](s), which is equal to zero. Hence, we have
E
g(k+1)∧τ I{τ<k}
τ,T (φτ I{τ<k}) = E
0
τ,T (φτ I{τ<k}) = φτ I{τ<k}.
where the last equality is due to the Fτ -measurability of φτ I{τ<k}.
From equations (16) and (17) we deduce (15). The proposition is thus proved. 
3.2 Discrete-time g-Snell envelope and optimal stopping times
We now turn to the optimal stopping problem of the beginning of the section. As is usual in
optimal control, we embed the above optimization problem (6) in a larger class of problems
by considering
Vk := ess supτ∈T d
k,T
Egk,τ (ξτ ), for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}. (18)
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The following definition is analogous to the definition of the Snell envelope of a given
process in discrete time, where we have replaced the mathematical expectation of the classi-
cal setting by a g-expectation. We define the process (Uk)k∈{0,1,...,T} by backward induction
as follows: {
UT = ξT ,
Uk = max
(
ξk; E
g
k,k+1(Uk+1)
)
, for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}.
(19)
From (19) we see by backward induction that (Uk) is a well-defined, (Fk)-adapted sequence
of square integrable random variables. The sequence (Uk) will be called the g-Snell envelope
in discrete time of (ξk).
We now give a characterization of the g-Snell envelope in discrete time of (ξk).
Proposition 3.1 The sequence (Uk)k∈{0,1,...,T} defined in equation (19) is the smallest g-
supermartingale in discrete time dominating the sequence (ξk)k∈{0,1,...,T}.
The proof of the above proposition is similar to the proof in the case of a classical
expectation and is given in the Appendix for reader’s convenience.
Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} be given. We define the following stopping time:
νk := inf{l ∈ {k, . . . , T} : Ul = ξl}. (20)
The following propositions hold true.
Proposition 3.2 Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. Let νk be the stopping time defined in (20).
The sequence (Ul∧νk)l∈{k,...,T} is a g
νk -martingale in discrete time.
Proof : Let l ∈ {k, . . . , T − 1}. We show that Ul∧νk = E
g
l,(l+1)∧νk
(U(l+1)∧νk) We write
Eg
l,(l+1)∧νk
(U(l+1)∧νk ) = I{νk≤l}E
g
l,(l+1)∧νk
(U(l+1)∧νk ) + I{νk≥l+1}E
g
l,(l+1)∧νk
(U(l+1)∧νk ). (21)
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we have, by definition of the solution of the BSDE with a
stopping time as a terminal time,
I{νk≤l}E
g
l,(l+1)∧νk
(U(l+1)∧νk ) = I{νk≤l}U(l+1)∧νk = I{νk≤l}Ul∧νk . (22)
For the second term on the right-hand side of equation (21) we use again the same arguments
as those of the proof of Theorem 3.1 (cf. equations (11) and (12)) to show
I{νk≥l+1}E
g
l,(l+1)∧νk
(U(l+1)∧νk) = I{νk≥l+1}E
g
l,l+1(Ul+1).
From the definition of νk we see that Ul > ξl on the set {νk ≥ l + 1}. Combining this
observation with the definition of U gives Ul = E
g
l,l+1(Ul+1) on the set {νk ≥ l+1}. Hence,
I{νk≥l+1}E
g
l,(l+1)∧νk
(U(l+1)∧νk) = I{νk≥l+1}Ul = I{νk≥l+1}Ul∧νk . (23)
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Plugging (22) and (23) in (21) gives the desired result.

In the following proposition we show that the stopping time νk defined in (20) is optimal
for the optimization problem (18) at time k and that the value function Vk of the problem
is equal to Uk (the g-Snell envelope in discrete time of (ξk)).
Theorem 3.2 For k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T},
Uk = E
g
k,νk
(ξνk) = ess supν∈Tk,T E
g
k,ν(ξν), (24)
where νk := inf{l ∈ {k, . . . , T} : Ul = ξl}.
Proof : In the case where k = T the result is trivially true. Suppose k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}.
By using Proposition 3.2 and Corollary 3.1 (applied with σ = k and τ = T ), and the fact
that Uνk = ξνk , we obtain
Uk = Uk∧νk = E
gνk
k,T (UT∧νk) = E
g
k,νk
(Uνk) = E
g
k,νk
(ξνk). (25)
Let ν ∈ Tk,T . By using Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 (applied with σ = k and τ = ν),
as well as the monotonicity of the functional Eg0,ν(·), we get
Uk ≥ E
g
k,ν(Uν) ≥ E
g
k,ν(ξν). (26)
Combining equations (25) and (26) gives the desired conclusion.

Remark 3.5 Families of non-linear operators {Et(·) : t ∈ [0, T ]} indexed by a single index
(as opposed to doubly-indexed families) are considered in several papers in the literature
on optimal stopping with non-linear functionals (cf., e.g., Krätschmer and Schoenmakers
(2010), and Bayraktar and Yao (2011)). We note that we work here with the doubly-indexed
family of operators {Egt,t′(·) : t, t
′ ∈ [0, T ]}. This family of operators reduces to the family
{Egt,T (·) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, indexed by a single index, under the additional assumption E
g
t,t′(η) =
Egt,T (η), 0 ≤ t ≤ t
′, for all t′ ∈ [0, T ], for all η ∈ L2(Ft′). By using the consistency
property of g-conditional expectations, it can be shown that this assumption is equivalent to
the assumption (mentioned in the introduction) Egt,T (η) = η, for all t ∈ [0, T ], for all η ∈
L2(Ft).
4 A non-zero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time related to
risk minimization
We now consider a game problem which is slightly more general than that of the introduc-
tion. We are given two agents A1 and A2 whose payoffs/financial positions are defined via
four F-adapted sequences X1, X2, Y 1, Y 2.
We make the following assumptions:
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(A1) X1 ≤ Y 1 and X2 ≤ Y 2 (that is, X1k ≤ Y
1
k and X
2
k ≤ Y
2
k , ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , T})
(A2) X1T = Y
1
T and X
2
T = Y
2
T .
(A3) The processes Y 1, Y 2,X1,X2 satisfy E(maxk∈{0,...,T} |Y
1
k |
2) <∞, E(maxk∈{0,...,T} |Y
2
k |
2) <
∞, E(maxk∈{0,...,T} |X
1
k |
2) <∞, E(maxk∈{0,...,T} |X
2
k |
2) <∞.
The set of strategies of each of the agents at time 0 is T d0,T . We emphasize that both
agents use discrete stopping times as strategies. If the first agent’s strategy is τ1 ∈ T
d
0,T and
the second agent’s strategy is τ2 ∈ T
d
0,T , the payoff of the first (resp. second) agent at time
τ1 ∧ τ2 is given by:
X1τ1I{τ1≤τ2} + Y
1
τ2
I{τ2<τ1} (resp. X
2
τ2
I{τ2<τ1} + Y
2
τ1
I{τ1≤τ2}),
where we have adopted the following convention: when τ1 = τ2, it is the first player who is
responsible for stopping the game.
The agents A1 and A2 evaluate the risk of their respective payoffs in a (possibly) different
manner.
More precisely, we are now given two standard Lipschitz drivers f1 and f2.
The dynamic risk measure of the first agent is equal to ρf1 = −Ef1 and the dynamic
risk measure of the second agent is equal to ρf2 = −Ef2 .
If the first agent’s strategy is τ1 ∈ T
d
0,T and the second agent’s strategy is τ2 ∈ T
d
0,T ,
the first agent’s (resp. second agent’s) risk at time 0 is thus given by −J1(τ1, τ2) (resp.
−J2(τ1, τ2)) where
J1(τ1, τ2) := E
f1
0,τ1∧τ2
(X1τ1I{τ1≤τ2} + Y
1
τ2
I{τ2<τ1})
(resp. J2(τ1, τ2) := E
f2
0,τ1∧τ2
(X2τ2I{τ2<τ1} + Y
2
τ1
I{τ1≤τ2})).
The two agents aim at minimizing the risk of their payoffs.
The problem with the game option presented in the introduction can be seen as a
particular case of the game described above, with the first agent A1 corresponding to
the buyer of the game option, the second agent A2 corresponding to the seller, and with
X1 = −Y 2 = X and Y 1 = −X2 = Y . Let us emphasize that even in this particular case
where the payoffs of the two agents are equal up to a minus sign, the game is of a non-
zero-sum type due to the non-linearity of the dynamic risk measures. The situation, also
mentioned in the introduction, where the seller and/or the buyer of the option apply their
risk measures to their net gains, also enters in the above general framework. For instance,
if the seller of the option takes into account his/her net gain, while the buyer considers the
payoff of the option only, we set: X1 = X, Y 1 = Y , Y 2 = −X + x, and X2 = −Y + x,
where x > 0 is the initial price of the option.
In this section, we investigate the question of the existence of a Nash equilibrium point
for the general game described above.
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Definition 4.1 (Nash equilibrium point) A pair of stopping times (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) ∈ T
d
0,T × T
d
0,T is
called a Nash equilibrium point for the above non-zero-sum Dynkin game if J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) ≥
J1(τ1, τ
∗
2 ) and J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) ≥ J2(τ
∗
1 , τ2), for any pair (τ1, τ2) of stopping times in T
d
0,T × T
d
0,T .
In other words, a pair of strategies is a Nash equilibrium of the game if any unilateral
deviation from that strategy on the part of one of the agents (the other agent’s strategy
remaining fixed) does not reduce his/her risk.
4.1 A preliminary result
We begin by a preliminary proposition in which we show that interchanging the strict and
large inequalities in the expression of the payoff process does not change the corresponding
value functions. This result will be used in the construction of a Nash equilibrium point in
the following sub-section.
Proposition 4.1 Let (Xk) and (Yk) be two F
d-adapted sequences of square-integrable ran-
dom variables such that Xk ≤ Yk, for all k ∈ {0, . . . , T}, XT = YT and E(maxk∈{0,...,T} |Xk|
2) <
∞. Let g be a standard driver and µ ∈ T d0,T . For each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}, let
ξ¯k := XkI{k≤µ} + YµI{µ<k} and ξk := XkI{k<µ} + YµI{µ≤k}.
For each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}, let
U¯k := ess supτ∈T d
k,T
Egk,τ∧µ(ξ¯τ ) and Uk := ess supτ∈T dk,T
Egk,τ∧µ(ξτ ),
which correspond to the gµ-Snell envelope in discrete time of (ξ¯k) and (ξk) respectively.
Then, the following properties hold true:
(i) U¯k = Yµ = Uk a.s. on {µ ≤ k − 1}.
(ii) U¯k = Uk a.s. for all k ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
Remark 4.1 The result can be seen as an analogue in our framework of a result by Lepeltier and Maingueneau
(1984)(lemma 5) shown in a continuous-time framework with right-continuous payoffs and
classical expectation.
Proof : Let us prove (i). We proceed by backward induction. A direct computation gives
UT = ξT = Yµ and U¯T = ξ¯T = Yµ on {µ ≤ T − 1}.
We suppose now that U¯k+1 = Yµ = Uk+1 a.s. on {µ ≤ k}.
We show that U¯k = Yµ = Uk a.s. on {µ ≤ k − 1}.
By using the definition of Uk, we have
UkI{µ≤k−1} = max
(
ξkI{µ≤k−1}; I{µ≤k−1}E
gµ
k,k+1(Uk+1)
)
. (27)
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Now, by the definition of ξk, we get
ξkI{µ≤k−1} = YµI{µ≤k−1} (28)
Moreover, by Proposition A.1 and the induction hypothesis, we get
I{µ≤k−1}E
gµ
k,k+1(Uk+1) = E
gµI{µ≤k−1}
k,k+1 (Uk+1I{µ≤k−1}) = E
gµI{µ≤k−1}
k,k+1 (YµI{µ≤k−1})
Now, the "driver" gµ(ω, s, y, z)I{µ(ω)≤k−1} is equal to g(ω, s, y, z)I{s≤µ(ω)≤k−1}I]k,T ](s) (ac-
cording to the convention used in Prop. A.1), which is equal to zero. Moreover, YµI{µ≤k−1}
is Fk-measurable. Therefore, E
gµI{µ≤k−1}
k,k+1 (YµI{µ≤k−1}) = YµI{µ≤k−1} a.s. By combining this
observation with equations (27) and (28), we get Uk = Yµ a.s. on {µ ≤ k − 1}. By similar
arguments we show that U¯k = Yµ a.s. on {µ ≤ k − 1} (to obtain this claim, it is sufficient
to replace U by U¯ , and ξ by ξ¯ in equation (27)). Property (i) is thus proven.
Let us prove property (ii). We proceed again by backward induction. At the final time T we
have UT = ξT = ξ¯T = U¯T (due to the assumption XT = YT ). Suppose that U¯k+1 = Uk+1.
Let us prove U¯k = Uk. We note that ξk = ξ¯k on the set {µ = k}
c. This observation, the
induction hypothesis, and the definitions of Uk and U¯k lead to the equality Uk = U¯k on the
set {µ = k}c. It remains to show that the equality also holds true on the set {µ = k}. By
using the definition of Uk, the definition of ξk and Proposition A.1, we get
UkI{µ=k} = max
(
ξkI{µ=k}; I{µ=k}E
gµ
k,k+1(Uk+1)
)
= max
(
YkI{µ=k}; E
gµI{µ=k}
k,k+1 (Uk+1I{µ=k})
)
.
(29)
Now, by property (i) which we have just proved, we have
E
gµI{µ=k}
k,k+1 (Uk+1I{µ=k}) = E
gµI{µ=k}
k,k+1 (YkI{µ=k}).
As the "driver" gµI{µ=k} is equal to 0 and YkI{µ=k} is Fk-measurable,
E
gµI{µ=k}
k,k+1 (YkI{µ=k}) = E
0
k,k+1(YkI{µ=k}) = YkI{µ=k}.
From the previous three expressions, we obtain UkI{µ=k} = YkI{µ=k}. Similarly, by using
the definition of U¯k, the definition of ξ¯k, Proposition A.1, and property (i), we get
U¯kI{µ=k} = max
(
ξ¯kI{µ=k}; I{µ=k}E
gµ
k,k+1(U¯k+1)
)
= max
(
XkI{µ=k}; E
gµI{µ=k}
k,k+1 (U¯k+1I{µ=k})
)
= max
(
XkI{µ=k}; E
gµI{µ=k}
k,k+1 (YkI{µ=k})
)
,
Moreover, E
gµI{µ=k}
k,k+1 (YkI{µ=k}) = E
0
k,k+1(YkI{µ=k}) = YkI{µ=k}. Hence, U¯kI{µ=k} = max(Xk;Yk)I{µ=k}.
As Xk ≤ Yk by assumption, we obtain U¯kI{µ=k} = YkI{µ=k}.
Thus, the equality U¯kI{µ=k} = UkI{µ=k} holds, which concludes the proof. 
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4.2 Construction of a Nash equilibrium point
Following ideas of Hamadène and Zhang (2010), and Hamadène and Hassani (2014), we
construct a Nash equilibrium point of the game described above by a recursive procedure.
We also rely on the preliminary result of the previous subsection (Prop. 4.1) and on the
results of Section 3.
Theorem 4.1 Our non-zero-sum game with g-expectations in discrete time admits a Nash
equilibrium point.
To prove this theorem, we construct a pair (τ2n+1, τ2n+2)n∈N of non-increasing sequences
of stopping times and we show that the limit (as n→∞) is a NEP of the game defined in
Section 2.
We set τ1 := T and τ2 := T . We suppose that the stopping times τ2n−1 and τ2n have been
defined.
We define f2n+11 (ω, t, ·, ·, ·) := f
τ2n
1 (ω, t, ·, ·, ·) := f1(ω, t, ·, ·, ·)I{t≤τ2n (ω)}. We note that
f2n+11 is a standard Lipschitz driver, as f1 is a standard Lipschitz driver.
We set, for all k ∈ {0, . . . , T},
ξ2n+1k := X
1
kI{k<τ2n} + Y
1
τ2n
I{τ2n≤k}
W 2n+1k := ess supτ∈T dk,T
E
f2n+11
k,τ (ξ
2n+1
τ )
τ˜2n+1 := inf{k ∈ {0, . . . , T} : W
2n+1
k = ξ
2n+1
k }
τ2n+1 := (τ˜2n+1 ∧ τ2n−1)I{τ˜2n+1∧τ2n−1<τ2n} + τ2n−1I{τ˜2n+1∧τ2n−1≥τ2n}.
(30)
Due to Theorem 3.2, the stopping time τ˜2n+1 is optimal for the above optimization problem
(30) at time 0: more precisely, we have W 2n+10 = supτ∈T d0,T
E
f2n+11
0,τ (ξ
2n+1
τ ) = E
f2n+11
0,τ˜2n+1
(ξ2n+1τ˜2n+1).
Moreover, thanks to Proposition 4.1 applied with µ := τ2n and g := f1, we have
W 2n+10 = sup
τ∈T d0,T
J1(τ, τ2n). (31)
We gather some more observations on the objects defined above in the following Remark
4.2 and Proposition 4.2.
Remark 4.2 (i) For all n ∈ N, τ2n+1 is a stopping time (this observation follows directly
from the definition of τ2n+1).
(ii) For all n ∈ N, for all τ ∈ T d0,T , ξ
2n+1
τ = ξ
2n+1
τ∧τ2n .
Moreover, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 (i) W 2n+1k I{τ2n≤k} = Y
1
τ2n
I{τ2n≤k}.
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(ii) For all n ∈ N, τ˜2n+1 = inf{k ∈ {0, . . . , T} : W
2n+1
k = X
1
k} ∧ τ2n. In particular,
τ˜2n+1 ≤ τ2n, for all n ∈ N.
Proof : Let us prove (i). From the definition of ξ2n+1 we have
ξ2n+1τ I{τ2n≤k} = Y
1
τ2n
I{τ2n≤k}, for all τ ∈ T
d
k,T . (32)
Due to the definition of the solution of a standard BSDE with a stopping time as a terminal
time, we have
I{τ2n≤k}E
f2n+11
k,τ∧τ2n
(ξ2n+1τ ) = I{τ2n≤k}ξ
2n+1
τ , for all τ ∈ T
d
k,T . (33)
Thus,
I{τ2n≤k}W
2n+1
k = I{τ2n≤k}ess supτ∈T dk,T
E
f2n+11
k,τ∧τ2n
(ξ2n+1τ )
= ess supτ∈T dk,T
I{τ2n≤k}E
f2n+11
k,τ∧τ2n
(ξ2n+1τ ) = I{τ2n≤k}ξ
2n+1
τ = I{τ2n≤k}Y
1
τ2n
,
where we have used equation (33) to obtain the last but one equality, and equation (32) to
obtain the last.
Let us prove (ii). By using the definition of τ˜2n+1, and that of ξ
2n+1, we have
τ˜2n+1 = inf{k ∈ {0, . . . , T} : W
2n+1
k I{k<τ2n}+W
2n+1
k I{τ2n≤k} = X
1
kI{k<τ2n}+Y
1
τ2n
I{τ2n≤k}}.
Thanks to this observation and to the previous property (i), we obtain
τ˜2n+1 = inf{k ∈ {0, . . . , T} : W
2n+1
k I{k<τ2n} = X
1
kI{k<τ2n}}
= inf{k ∈ {0, . . . , T} : W 2n+1k = X
1
k} ∧ τ2n.

We define f2n+22 (ω, t, ·, ·, ·) := f
τ2n+1
2 (ω, t, ·, ·, ·) := f2(ω, t, ·, ·, ·)I{t≤τ2n+1 (ω)}. Similarly
to the definitions of (30), we set
ξ2n+2k := X
2
kI{k<τ2n+1} + Y
2
τ2n+1
I{τ2n+1≤k}
W 2n+2k := ess supτ∈T dk,T
E
f2n+22
k,τ (ξ
2n+2
τ )
τ˜2n+2 := inf{k ∈ {0, . . . , T} : W
2n+2
k = ξ
2n+2
k }
τ2n+2 := (τ˜2n+2 ∧ τ2n)I{τ˜2n+2∧τ2n<τ2n+1} + τ2nI{τ˜2n+2∧τ2n≥τ2n+1}.
(34)
We note that the objects defined in the previous equation (34) satisfy properties analogous
to those of Remark 4.2 and Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.3 For all m ≥ 1, τ˜m+2 ≤ τm P -a.s..
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Proof : We suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists m ≥ 1 such that P (τm <
τ˜m+2) > 0, and we set n := min{m ≥ 1 : P (τm < τ˜m+2) > 0}. We have n ≥ 3.
The definition of n implies τ˜n+1 ≤ τn−1. This observation, combined with the definition of
τn+1 and with the inequality of part (ii) of proposition 4.2, gives
τn+1 = τ˜n+1I{τ˜n+1<τn} + τn−1I{τ˜n+1=τn}. (35)
For similar reasons we have
τn = τ˜nI{τ˜n<τn−1} + τn−2I{τ˜n=τn−1}. (36)
For the easing of the presentation, we set Γ := {τn < τ˜n+2}. On the set Γ, we have:
1. τn < τ˜n+2 ≤ τn+1 (the last inequality being again due to property (ii) of Prop. 4.2).
2. τn+1 = τn−1. This observation is due to 1, combined with the equality (35).
3. ξn+2 = ξn. This is a direct consequence of 2 and the definitions of ξn+2 and ξn.
4. τn = τ˜n. We prove that {τ˜n = τn−1}∩Γ = ∅ which, together with the expression (36),
gives the desired statement. Due to (36) we have {τ˜n = τn−1} = {τ˜n = τn−1}∩ {τn =
τn−2}. Thus, {τ˜n = τn−1} ∩ Γ = {τ˜n = τn−1, τn = τn−2 < τ˜n+2}. Now, we have
τ˜n ≤ τn−2 (due to the definition of n). Thus, {τ˜n = τn−1} ∩ Γ = {τ˜n = τn−1 ≤ τn =
τn−2 < τ˜n+2} = ∅, the last equality being due to τ˜n+2 ≤ τn−1.
We note that combining properties 1 and 4 gives τ˜n < τ˜n+2 on Γ. We will obtain a
contradiction with this property. To this end, let us show that
IΓW
n+2
τ˜n
= IΓξ
n+2
τ˜n
. (37)
By definition of τ˜n, we have W
n
τ˜n
= ξnτ˜n . This observation combined with property 3 gives
W nτ˜n = ξ
n
τ˜n
= ξn+2τ˜n on Γ. Thus, in order to show equality (37) it suffices to show
IΓW
n+2
τ˜n
= IΓW
n
τ˜n . (38)
In the following computations fn+2i is equal to f
n+2
1 (resp. f
n+2
2 ) if n + 2 is an odd
(resp. even) number; similarly, fni is equal to f
n
1 (resp. f
n
2 ) if n is an odd (resp. even)
number. By using property 4 and Proposition A.1 of the appendix, applied with A := Γ
which is Fτn-measurable, we obtain IΓW
n+2
τ˜n
= IΓW
n+2
τn
= ess supτ∈Tτn,T IΓE
fn+2i
τn,τ (ξ
n+2
τ ) =
ess supτ∈Tτn,T E
fn+2i IΓ
τn,τ (IΓξ
n+2
τ ). Now, by using the definitions of f
n+2
i and f
n
i , as well as
property 2, we have:
fn+2i (ω, t, y, z, k)IΓ(ω) = fi(ω, t, y, z, k)I{t≤τn+1(ω)}IΓ(ω) = fi(ω, t, y, z, k)I{t≤τn−1(ω)}IΓ(ω) =
fni (ω, t, y, z, k)IΓ(ω). By using this observation and property 3, we obtain E
fn+2i IΓ
τn,τ (IΓξ
n+2
τ ) =
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E
fni IΓ
τn,τ (IΓξ
n
τ ). By using again Proposition A.1 from the appendix, we get E
fni IΓ
τn,τ (IΓξ
n
τ ) =
IΓE
fni
τn,τ (ξ
n
τ ). Combining the previous equalities leads to IΓW
n+2
τ˜n
= ess supτ∈Tτn,T IΓE
fni
τn,τ (ξ
n
τ ) =
IΓess supτ∈Tτn,T E
fni
τn,τ (ξ
n
τ ) = IΓW
n
τn = IΓW
n
τ˜n
, where we have again used property 4 to ob-
tain the last equality. The proof of equality (38), and hence also of equality (37), is thus
completed. From equality (37) and from the definition of τ˜n+2 we deduce τ˜n+2 ≤ τ˜n on Γ,
which is in contradiction with τ˜n < τ˜n+2 on Γ. The proposition is thus proved. 
Corollary 4.1 (i) For all n ≥ 2, τn+1 = τ˜n+1I{τ˜n+1<τn} + τn−1I{τ˜n+1=τn}.
(ii) For all n ≥ 2, τ˜n+1 = τn+1 ∧ τn.
Proof : The proof of assertion (i) is a direct consequence of the definition of τn+1, combined
with the previous proposition 4.3 and with property (ii) of proposition 4.2.
Let us prove (ii). By using the previous assertion (i), we obtain
τn+1 ∧ τn = (τ˜n+1 ∧ τn)I{τ˜n+1<τn} + (τn−1 ∧ τn)I{τ˜n+1=τn}
= τ˜n+1I{τ˜n+1<τn} + (τn−1 ∧ τ˜n+1)I{τ˜n+1=τn}.
By using the previous proposition 4.3 and property (ii) of proposition 4.2, we conclude that
τn+1 ∧ τn = τ˜n+1I{τ˜n+1<τn} + τ˜n+1I{τ˜n+1=τn} = τ˜n+1. 
Lemma 4.1 On {τn = τn−1} we have τm = T, ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof : The proof is similar to that of lemma 3.1 in Hamadène and Zhang (2010) and is
given for reader’s convenience. We proceed by induction. The result is trivially true for
n = 2. Assume that the result holds for n − 1, where n ≥ 3. From the expression of τn
from the previous Corollary 4.1, part (i), we see that τn = τn−2 on {τn = τn−1}, and we
conclude by using the induction hypothesis. 
Proposition 4.4 The following inequalities hold true:
J1(τ, τ2n) ≤ J1(τ2n+1, τ2n), for all τ ∈ T
d
0,T .
J2(τ2n+1, τ) ≤ J2(τ2n+1, τ2n+2), for all τ ∈ T
d
0,T .
In other words, the strategy τ2n+1 is optimal for the first agent at time 0 when the second
agent’s strategy is fixed at τ2n. The strategy τ2n+2 is optimal for the second agent at time
0 when the first agent’s strategy is fixed at τ2n+1.
Proof : We will prove the first inequality. The second one can be proved by means of
similar arguments. Due to equation (31), we have
J1(τ, τ2n) ≤W
2n+1
0 . (39)
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On the other hand,
J1(τ2n+1, τ2n) = E
f2n+11
0,τ2n+1∧τ2n
(
X1τ2n+1I{τ2n+1≤τ2n} + Y
1
τ2n
I{τ2n<τ2n+1}
)
= E
f2n+11
0,τ2n+1∧τ2n
(ξ2n+1τ2n+1),
where Lemma 4.1 and Assumption (A2) (that is, the assumption X1T = Y
1
T ) have been used
to obtain the last equality. We use Remark 4.2, Corollary 4.1 (part (ii)), and the optimality
of τ˜2n+1 to obtain
E
f2n+11
0,τ2n+1∧τ2n
(ξ2n+1τ2n+1) = E
f2n+11
0,τ2n+1∧τ2n
(ξ2n+1τ2n+1∧τ2n) = E
f2n+11
0,τ˜2n+1
(ξ2n+1τ˜2n+1) = W
2n+1
0 .
Thus, J1(τ2n+1, τ2n) = W
2n+1
0 , which, combined with (39), gives the desired result. 
Remark 4.3 As a by-product of the above proof we obtain: W 2n+10 = E
f2n+11
0,τ2n+1∧τ2n
(ξ2n+1τ2n+1).
We conlude that the stopping time τ2n+1 is also optimal (at time t = 0) for the optimization
problem (30).
We define τ∗1 and τ
∗
2 by τ
∗
1 := limn→∞ τ2n+1 and τ
∗
2 := limn→∞ τ2n.
We note that τ∗1 and τ
∗
2 are stopping times in T
d
0,T .
We now prove that we can pass to the limit in the inequalities of the previous proposition.
Proposition 4.5 (i) For all τ ∈ T d0,T , limn→∞ J1(τ, τ2n) = J1(τ, τ
∗
2 ) and limn→∞ J2(τ2n+1, τ) =
J2(τ
∗
1 , τ).
(ii) limn→∞ J1(τ2n+1, τ2n) = J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) and limn→∞ J2(τ2n+1, τ2n+2) = J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ).
Proof : Let us prove the first assertion of part (i). The other assertions can be proved
by similar arguments; the details are left to the reader. For the easing of the presen-
tation, we set ξ¯2n+1t := X
1
t I{t≤τ2n} + Y
1
τ2n
I{τ2n<t} (the process ξ¯
2n+1 corresponds to the
reward process of the first agent when the second agent’s strategy is τ2n). We also set
ξ¯
τ∗2
t := X
1
t I{t≤τ∗2 }
+ Y 1τ∗2
I{τ∗2<t}
. With this notation, we have J1(τ, τ2n) = E
f1
0,τ∧τ2n
(ξ¯2n+1τ )
and J1(τ, τ
∗
2 ) = E
f1
0,τ∧τ∗2
(ξ¯
τ∗2
τ ). We note that the sequence (τ ∧ τ2n) converges from above to
τ ∧ τ∗2 . Suppose that we have shown
ξ¯2n+1τ −→
n→∞
ξ¯
τ∗2
τ a.s. and E(sup
n
(ξ¯2n+1τ )
2) < +∞. (40)
Then, by the continuity property of the solutions of BSDEs with respect to both termi-
nal time and terminal condition (see proposition A.6 in Quenez and Sulem (2013)), we get
limn→∞ J1(τ, τ2n) = J1(τ, τ
∗
2 ), which is the desired result.
It remains to check (40). Now, the sequence (τ ∧ τ2n) converges a.s. and τ ∧ τ2n is val-
ued in the finite set {0, . . . , T}. It follows that for almost every ω, the sequence of reals
(τ(ω) ∧ τ2n(ω)) is stationary, which implies that the sequence (ξ¯
2n+1
τ (ω)) is also stationary
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and converges to ξ¯
τ∗2
τ (ω). Finally, we check that E(supn(ξ¯
2n+1
τ )
2) < +∞, which is due to
the inequality |ξ¯2n+1τ |
2 ≤ 2|X1τ |
2 + 2|Y 1τ2n |
2, to the assumption (A3) , and to the square
integrability of X1. The proof is thus complete. 
Conclusion: We deduce from the previous two propositions (Prop. 4.4 and Prop. 4.5)
that J1(τ, τ
∗
2 ) ≤ J1(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ), for all τ ∈ T
d
0,T , and J2(τ
∗
1 , τ) ≤ J2(τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ), for all τ ∈ T
d
0,T ; in
other words, (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) is a NEP of our Dynkin game.
Remark 4.4 We note that the proof of Proposition 4.5 relies on the fact that the stopping
times in the framework of our paper are valued in a finite set. Proposition 4.5 (more
specifically, statement (ii)) seems difficult to establish in a continuous time framework.
More precisely, due to the fact that a convergent sequence of reals in [0, T ] is not necessarily
stationary, it is not so clear that it is possible to derive statement (ii) of Proposition 4.5
from Proposition 4.4, contrary to the discrete case.
5 Further developments
The results given in the present paper can be generalized to the case of strategies valued in
a finite set of stopping times. More specifically, let us consider the following setting: Let
T be a positive real number. Let K ∈ N. Let θ0, θ1, ..., θK be K + 1 (distinct) F-stopping
times with values in [0, T ] such that 0 = θ0 ≤ θ1 ≤ . . . ≤ θK = T a.s. We consider a
stopper who, in each scenario ω ∈ Ω, can act only at times θ0(ω), θ1(ω), ...,θK(ω). In
other words, the stopper can choose his/her strategy among the stopping times τ of the
form τ =
∑K
i=0 θi1Ai , where (Ai)i∈{0,...,K} is a partition of Ω such that Ai ∈ Fθi , for all
i ∈ {0, . . . ,K}. We denote by Θ this set of stopping times. We are also given an F- adapted
square-integrable payoff process (ξt)t∈[0,T ]. In this framework the optimal stopping problem
of Section 3 becomes: V0 := supτ∈Θ E
g
0,τ (ξτ ). A game problem analogous to that of Section
4, where the set of stopping times T d0,T is replaced by the set Θ, can also be formulated.
In the particular case where the stopping times θ0, θ1, ..., θK are strictly ordered (that is,
0 = θ0 < θ1 < ... < θK = T a.s.), the two problems can be addressed by using techniques
similar to those used in the present paper, combined with a change of variables. For the
general case (cf. our ongoing work Grigorova and Quenez (2016)), we need some additional
arguments related to the work of Kobylanski and Quenez (2012),Kobylanski et al. (2011).
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A Appendix
Remark A.1 Let (ζ, g) be standard parameters and let Y be the solution of the BSDE with
parameters (ζ, g). Let τ ∈ T0,T be a stopping time. Let Y¯ be the solution associated with
driver g1]τ,T ] and terminal condition ζ. We have Y¯t = Yt1[τ,T ] a.s. Thus, the process Y¯ can
be seen as the restriction of Y on [τ, T ].
Remark A.2 Let τ ∈ T0,T be a stopping time . By ]τ, T ] we denote the set {(ω, t) ∈
Ω × [0, T ] : τ(ω) < t ≤ T}. Let us recall the following: for A ∈ Fτ , the process IAI]τ,T ] is
adapted left-continuous and thus predictable. Thus, if g is a standard Lipschitz driver, then
gIAI]τ,T ] is also a standard Lipschitz driver. For notational simplicity, the driver gIAI]τ,T ]
will be denoted by gIA. This makes sense if we consider the BSDE restricted to [τ, T ], which
will be the case in the sequel.
The following easy proposition is used in the proof of some of the results of the main
part.
Proposition A.1 Let (g, ζ) be standard parameters. Let τ ∈ T0,T be a stopping time and
let A ∈ Fτ . We have IAE
g
τ,T (ζ) = E
gIA
τ,T (IAζ), where we have used the notational convention
of Remark A.2.
Remark A.3 Proposition A.1 is to be compared with the "zero-one law" for g-expectations.
We note that the assumption g(s, 0, 0, 0) = 0, required in the "zero-one law" for g-expectations,
is not required in the above proposition.
Proof : The proof, which is similar to that of the "zero-one law" for g-expectations (cf., for
instance, (Peng, 2004, page 30)), is given for the convenience of the reader. Let (Y,Z, k) be
the unique solution of the BSDE with standard parameters (g, ζ). Thus, (Y,Z, k) satisfies
the equation
Yu∨τ = ζ+
∫ T
u∨τ
g(s, Ys, Zs, ks)ds−
∫ T
u∨τ
ZsdWs−
∫ T
u∨τ
∫
E
ks(e)N˜ (ds, de), for all u ∈ [0, T ].
(41)
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We note that IAg(s, Ys, Zs, ks) = IAg(s, IAYs, IAZs, IAks). By multiplying both sides of the
equation (41) by IA and by using the previous observation, we obtain: for all u ∈ [0, T ],
IAYu∨τ = IAζ +
∫ T
u∨τ
IAg(s, IAYs, IAZs, IAks)ds−
∫ T
u∨τ
IAZsdWs
−
∫ T
u∨τ
∫
E
IAks(e)N˜ (ds, de)
= IAζ +
∫ T
u∨τ
IAg(s, IAYs, IAZs, IAks)I]τ,T ](s)ds −
∫ T
u∨τ
IAZsdWs
−
∫ T
u∨τ
∫
E
IAks(e)N˜ (ds, de).
Hence, for a.e. ω ∈ Ω, for all u such that τ(ω) ≤ u ≤ T ,
IAYu = IAζ +
∫ T
u
IAg(s, IAYs, IAZs, IAks)I]τ,T ](s)ds −
∫ T
u
IAZsdWs
−
∫ T
u
∫
E
IAks(e)N˜ (ds, de).
From this and the uniqueness of the solution of the BSDE with standard parameters, we
get that the triple (IAY, IAZ, IAk) is the unique solution on [τ, T ] of the BSDE with standard
parameters (IAζ, gIAI]τ,T ]). In terms of g-expectations we can thus write the following:
IAE
g
τ,T (ζ) = E
gIA
τ,T (IAζ), where we have used the notational convention of Remark A.2. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: From the definition of (Uk), we get Uk ≥ ξk, for all k ∈
{0, 1, . . . , T} and Uk ≥ E
g
k,k+1(ξk+1), for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. Hence, the sequence (Uk)
is a g-supermartingale in discrete time dominating the sequence (ξk). Let (U˜k)k∈{0,1,...,T}
be a g-supermartingale in discrete time dominating the sequence (ξk). We show that U˜k ≥
Uk, for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}, by backward induction. At time T we have U˜T ≥ ξT =
UT . We suppose that U˜k+1 ≥ Uk+1. By using the g-supermartingale property of U˜ , the
induction hypothesis and the monotonicity property of the operator Egk,k+1(·), we get U˜k ≥
Egk,k+1(U˜k+1) ≥ E
g
k,k+1(Uk+1). On the other hand, U˜k ≥ ξk by definition of U˜ . Thus, we
get U˜k ≥ max
(
ξk; E
g
k,k+1(Uk+1)
)
. We conclude by recalling that the right-hand side of the
previous inequality is equal to Uk.
